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 Public Opinion and the Abolition or Retention of the Death Penalty 
Why is the United States Different? 
 
Sara Sun Beale
*
 
 
 
 What explains the difference between the United States and the many other countries that 
have abolished capital punishment?  Because the United States and many other nations that have 
abolished the death penalty are democracies, there seems to be an obvious answer: abolition or 
retention reflects the preferences of the electorate.  According to this view, the U.S. electorate is 
simply more punitive, and the question becomes explaining the difference in national attitudes.  
There is some truth to this explanation.  As I have argued elsewhere, the U.S. public generally 
does favor punitive criminal justice policies.
1
  But that cannot be the whole story.  Other nations 
have abolished capital punishment despite widespread public support—in many cases, support of 
more than 70 percent of the public at the time of abolition.  In the United States, however, after 
the Supreme Court imposed a de facto moratorium on capital punishment in the early 1970s, 
strong public support led to its reintroduction in two-thirds of the states. 
 
 This paper explores the relationship between public opinion and the abolition or retention 
of the death penalty, comparing the U.S. experience to that of other nations (with a particular 
focus on Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada).  Although the experience of each 
country includes distinctive elements, several common themes emerge. In each country, political 
elites led the abolition movement. The structure of the electoral process and the parliamentary 
party system, moreover, allowed legislators and other public officials a degree of insulation from 
popular opinion. The elites differed from their electorates in education, experience, and 
knowledge of the issue.  Because of these differences, support for capital punishment was much 
lower among these elites than among the general public.  In abolishing capital punishment, the 
elites acted in accordance with their own views, rather than those of the median voter or the 
general public.  Some scholars have characterized this type of political behavior as the “elite 
leadership hypothesis.” Additionally, international agreements and norms played a significant 
role in Europe, making abolition difficult to reverse once enacted and helping to persuade other 
nations to abolish capital punishment despite the existence of popular support.  Finally, abolition 
(whether de jure or de facto) has had a tendency over time to reduce public support for capital 
punishment, thus diminishing popular pressure to reverse course. 
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 In contrast, the U.S. system has what one observer has called “hyper-democracy,”2 which 
greatly reduces the likelihood that political elites will lead a movement toward the abolition of 
capital punishment.  Various features of the U.S. electoral process subject legislators and other 
elected officials to significantly more political pressure than their international counterparts, 
especially on hot-button issues like capital punishment. As a result, U.S. political elites have 
much stronger incentives to act in accordance with public opinion.  The federal structure has also 
made abolition more difficult.  The states have primary authority over the criminal law.  
Although eighteen states have abolished the death penalty, support for the death penalty remains 
very high in other states (especially in the South and Southwest).  Additionally, the American 
public and elected elites place little weight on international opinion, and the United States has 
not joined international agreements that would require abolition.  Paradoxically, however, the 
Supreme Court has relied upon public opinion to overrule the results of the democratic process, 
restricting (though not eliminating) capital punishment under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause.   
 
In light of the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to abolish capital punishment, opponents 
of capital punishment have adopted a two-pronged strategy.  First, they are bringing 
constitutional challenges to the methods of execution.  Second, they are focusing their political 
energy on state legislatures, where their arguments for abolishing the death penalty include both 
the risk of wrongful convictions and the high cost of capital punishment relative to life 
imprisonment. 
 
 After a general comparison of key differences between the electoral structure of the 
United States and abolitionist countries, this paper turns to brief case studies of the abolition 
experience in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada.  The final section then 
contrasts these case studies with the U.S. experience. 
 
I.  Institutional Structures and Political Culture 
 
A. The U.S. System: Hard Wired to Be Responsive to Public Opinion 
 
 In the United States a variety of institutional structures and closely related cultural 
features make legislators and other political leaders highly responsive to public opinion and also 
less likely to act on distinctive elite views.  Short electoral cycles, term limits, and the primary 
election system mean that even the most senior elected officials are continuously considering the 
electoral implications of their actions, raising campaign contributions, and often deliberately 
cultivating an anti-elite image. 
At both the state and federal level, terms of service and electoral cycles are generally 
short.  In general, state laws provide for two-year terms for members in the lower state house, 
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two- or four-year terms for the upper chamber,
 3
 and four-year terms for the governor.  In 
addition, fifteen states limit the number of years an elected member may serve in the state 
legislature,
4
 and many states also have term limits for the governor.  At the federal level, 
members of the House of Representatives serve two-year terms, the President serves a four-year 
term, and Senators serve six-year terms.   
Primary elections are used to select the Republican and Democratic candidate for each 
electoral position, and even incumbents must run in the primary election.  In state and federal 
elections, even senior party leaders may lose their positions in the primary or general election if 
they are perceived as out of touch with the voters in their district.  For example, in June 2014, the 
second-highest-ranking Republican in the House of Representatives, Majority Leader Eric 
Cantor, was defeated in the primary election by a political newcomer who ran with the 
endorsement of the Tea Party.  The winning candidate criticized Cantor for being too willing to 
compromise on immigration and support some form of amnesty for undocumented immigrants.  
A conservative commentator said “that the primary results were ‘an absolute repudiation of 
establishment politics’ and that Republican leaders should take note.”5  Indeed, the media 
attributed Cantor’s loss, in part, to the close associations he maintained with political elites in 
Washington at the expense of serving his own constituents.
6
  Commentators predicted that 
Cantor’s defeat would push the Republican House leadership further to the right and embolden 
the chamber’s most stubborn conservatives, who had long chafed at what they saw as “an 
accommodating leadership.”7  Similar defeats have occurred in general elections: in 1994, House 
Speaker Thomas Foley, the leader of the House Democrats, lost to a little-known Republican 
during a general election that delivered control of Congress to the Republicans.
8
 
The political culture in the United States generally rewards candidates “who are 
conspicuously anti-elitist in their rhetoric and folksy in their self-presentation.”9  For example, 
some voters supported George W. Bush because “he is a ‘guy’s guy.’… because he seems like 
the kind of guy you could ‘sit down and have a beer with.’ You know, kick back with a couple of 
ice cold Budweisers, talk about deer hunting, and then go out back and cut down some trees 
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together.”10  Seeking to capitalize on this phenomenon, candidates frequently dress in jeans or 
other casual clothing at public appearances and in photographs for their campaign literature. 
Carol Steiker argues that this institutional culture creates a strong tendency to defer to 
public opinion rather than adopt a distinctly elite position: 
 
…Americans have always tended toward a conception of government as appropriately 
“provincial, amateur, authentic, spontaneous, candid, homogeneous, traditional, popular, 
organic, rights-oriented, religious, voluntary, participatory, and rotational” as opposed to 
“cosmopolitan, expert, authoritative, efficient, confidential, articulated in its parts, 
progressive, elite, mechanical, duties-oriented, secular, regulatory, and delegative.” This 
political culture creates a strong tendency to defer to clear majority sentiment, not merely 
as a matter of political expediency, but also as a reflection of the role-conception of 
elected officials.
11
 
 
B. The Abolitionist States: Insulating Public Officials From Public Opinion 
 
From a U.S. perspective, the idea that elected officials would buck public opinion on a major 
issue like capital punishment is surprising, but that is exactly what occurred in virtually every 
country that abolished the death penalty.  Although each case study described below includes 
unique features or historical events, common elements of the electoral systems promoted a 
critical degree of independence from public opinion.  Institutional and cultural factors also 
fostered the development of politicians who understood their role to be using their expertise to 
make decisions in the public interest, rather than simply representing the views of the electorate.   
Once each country had abolished capital punishment, two other factors then made its 
reintroduction less likely.  First, several international treaties banned capital punishment, making 
it much more difficult for signatory countries to change course while at the same time giving 
politicians an excuse for maintaining the status quo. Second, abolition itself seemed to change 
public opinion over time, reducing support for capital punishment. 
In general, capital punishment fell under the jurisdiction of the national legislature in the 
countries studied,
12
 and their electoral systems shielded individual legislators somewhat from 
reprisals from the electorate for their votes on an issue such as capital punishment.  In these 
electoral systems, incumbent members typically held terms of office significantly longer than 
their U.S. counterparts.  Moreover, primary elections generally were not used in Europe or 
Canada, and voters selected candidates in the general election on the basis of their party 
affiliation, rather than voting for individuals.  Most incumbents did not anticipate facing a 
reelection campaign within two years or less, including a primary in which they may be 
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challenged within their own party.  Moreover, the fact that political parties chose their own 
candidates for election rather than “throwing the question open to popular intervention” reduced 
the chance that candidates would have to take populist stances on hotly contested issues like 
capital punishment.
13
  It thus seems likely that, when deciding whether to abolish capital 
punishment, legislators were less concerned about reelection than their U.S. counterparts. 
These institutional features also promoted “a political culture in which political leaders are 
viewed and view themselves as educated elites who have a duty to make decisions in light of 
their expertise and thus, more often than in the United States, to lead the public rather than 
follow it.”14  This is consistent with a trustee model of representation (associated with Edmund 
Burke), rather than a delegate model.
15
 Given these institutional features, elites opposed to 
capital punishment were more likely than their U.S. counterparts to openly support abolition,  
and elite opinion became increasingly opposed to capital punishment.  Politicians and other 
influential elites accorded significant weight to research demonstrating that capital punishment 
had no significant deterrent effect and that innocent persons had likely been executed.  
 Because policy concerning capital punishment was made at a national level, international 
norms were more influential.
16
  And once capital punishment had been abolished, international 
treaties made the reintroduction of capital punishment less likely.  The Council of Europe played 
a leading role in the battle for abolition, and all of the Council’s forty-seven member states have 
now either abolished capital punishment or at least instituted a moratorium on executions.  In 
1983, the Council adopted a protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights banning the 
death penalty except in time of war, and in 2002, it abolished capital punishment in all 
circumstances, even for acts committed in times of war.
17
  Abolition of the death penalty is now 
a precondition for entry into the European Union.
18
  After abolition, these international treaties 
serve both a legal and a political function.  As a legal matter, they remove the issue from the 
normal legislative agenda. As a political matter, politicians who want to maintain abolition and 
satisfy the public can explain that international obligations effectively tie their hands.
19
  Finally, 
these treaties provided an impetus for change in other countries (such as Turkey) that had not 
already abolished the death penalty but wished to gain membership in the EU. 
 Finally, after a sufficient period, abolition has tended to delegitimize the death penalty 
and reduce public support, thus diminishing the pressure for reintroduction.
20
  One study found 
that, controlling for all other variables, citizens residing in a country with the death penalty are 
almost three times as likely to support the death penalty as citizens living in a country without 
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the death penalty.
21
  For instance, in France, support for the death penalty fell by 20 percent over 
the course of approximately twenty-five years.
22
  Similarly, more than fifty years after abolition 
of the death penalty in Germany, public support had fallen by more than 50 percent.
23
  This 
change in behavior did not happen immediately, and it was likely due in part to the attitudes of 
younger generations who grew up without capital punishment.
24
  
II.  Case Studies 
 
 This section provides brief case studies of abolition in Germany, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and France, which are discussed in chronological order.   
 
A.  Germany25 
 
The German politicians and other elites who brought about the abolition of capital 
punishment in 1949 were influenced by two major factors: scholarship demonstrating that capital 
punishment did not deter crime and had a brutalizing effect on the public, and Germany’s 
experience with state-sponsored violence during World War II.
26
  Abolition was accomplished 
by adding Article 102 to the “Basic Law” (which functions as Germany’s constitution).  At the 
time of abolition, 77 percent of the public supported capital punishment,
27
 but German political 
elites viewed the public as inexpert and uninterested in important scholarship demonstrating its 
lack of deterrence.
28
 Some country-specific factors also played an important role. The recent 
Nazi regime’s abuses of the death penalty served as a cautionary tale of the evils of state-
sponsored violence.
29
   
 
Germany’s institutional structure and norms created the necessary environment for change by 
providing a degree of insulation from public opinion.  The structure of Germany’s representative 
democracy buffered the political elites from constantly changing political opinion, and these 
elites understood their role in Burkean terms.
30
  One politician went so far as to characterize the 
essence of democracy as a “parliamentary aristocracy governed by well-trained elites.”31  
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Although German politicians might not use this language today,
32
 it conveys an important insight 
into the structure of European politics.  
 
The German electoral process insulates members of the German federal parliament, the 
Bundestag, from the electorate.  Although some members of the Bundestag are directly elected, 
others are selected by their political party, which places them on its list of candidates.
33
  The 
majority party or governing coalition then selects the prime minister.  This institutional structure  
somewhat shields German representatives from  popular opinion and puts primacy on a Burkean 
trusteeship model of government where a politician’s action is not dictated simply by the 
preference of a majority of his constituency.
34
  This structure, and the norms that underlie it, 
allowed the key German political actors to act outside of public opinion and in accordance with 
their own understanding of the negative effects of capital punishment. 
 
 Expert opinion was critical not only to the abolition of capital punishment 1949, but also 
in preventing reinstatement.  The German Criminal Law Commission “played an important role 
in deferring and defusing the contentious issue of capital punishment.”35  In the late 1950s, 
reinstatement of capital punishment gained political support.
36
  At that time, individual 
lawmakers in Germany normally did not submit important legislation unless it had been worked 
out in relevant government ministries and was subsequently voted on by the Federal Cabinet.
37
 
In matters of criminal law, the Federal Cabinet largely deferred to the Commission, which was 
composed of academics, judges, prosecutors, and other legal bureaucrats,
38
 who consistently 
opposed the death penalty.
39
  This process allowed politicians to avoid reprisal from the public, 
both before and after the Commission made decisions.  Politicians could point to the 
Commission’s ongoing deliberations as “an excuse to defer considering the question 
themselves,” and after its vote “they could avoid taking personal responsibility for any position 
on the death penalty by pointing to the Commission’s careful consideration of the issue and the 
rejection of capital punishment.”40  Additionally, abolition’s constitutional status meant that even 
strong majorities fell short of the required two-thirds vote to amend the Basic Law.
41
   
 
Finally, Germany signed onto several international treaties codifying abolition, thus 
further adding to the institutional barriers preventing the reintroduction of capital punishment.  
Germany is a party to Protocols 6 and 13 of the Council of Europe, which ban capital 
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punishment.
42
  Further complicating any effort to reintroduce capital punishment, abolition of the 
death penalty is also a precondition for entry to or membership in the European Union.
43
 
 
B. United Kingdom 
 
 In the United Kingdom, as in Germany, opposition to capital punishment became 
increasingly prevalent among elites, and elite views carried the day in Parliament despite strong 
public support for retention.  Elites were influenced by research demonstrating a lack of any 
deterrent effect,
44
 and there were recent cases in which it appeared that innocent men had been 
executed for crimes they did not commit.
45
  When the Labour government took office in 1964, 
there was widespread support for abolition among members of the House of Commons, 
including Conservatives,
46
 and the new government gave its support—first tacit and later 
explicit—to abolition legislation sponsored by a backbencher who was not part of party 
leadership.  Despite public opinion polls showing that 60 to 70 percent of the electorate favored 
retention, Parliament imposed a five-year ban on capital punishment.
47
  Four years later, 
Parliament abolished capital punishment for ordinary crimes.
48
  The Conservative party chose 
not to make an issue of Labour policies that might have engaged “the more extreme prejudices of 
the electorate,”49 and leaders of the three major parties voted individually for the bill making 
abolition permanent. 
 
 The government did not publicly support the initial steps toward abolition, though it 
provided increasingly strong support.  The legislation that suspended the death penalty for five 
years arose from a private member’s bill,50 and it was passed by a free vote.51  The issuing 
member of the bill was Sydney Silverman, a backbencher at the time, who was a former Labour 
party leader and longtime opponent of the death penalty.
52
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  Reliance on the private-member bill and a free vote allowed the Labour party to claim 
that the abolition of the death penalty was not part of its agenda.  The bill originated from a 
backbencher and was voted on individually by members of Parliament.
53
  Behind the scenes, 
however, the government provided significant support for the moratorium bill.  It made 
legislative time available and encouraged the Queen to express support for the bill.
54
  When she 
later mentioned the bill in a speech, it was the first time she had referred to a private member’s 
bill in her public comments.
55
 
 
In 1969, the Labour party leadership decided to schedule the final vote on abolition a year 
earlier than initially planned to reduce its proximity to the next general election.
56
  Although this 
was again a free vote, party leaders led by example, with all three major party leaders in the 
House of Commons voting for abolition.
57
  This leadership proved invaluable, as it heavily 
influenced the House of Lords to pass the measure, and led to the permanent abolition of the 
death penalty in 1969.
58
  
 
 The United Kingdom’s commitment to international treaties has erected significant 
obstacles to any attempts to reintroduce capital punishment.  In 2002, the United Kingdom 
signed Protocol No. 13 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, which prohibits capital punishment in all circumstances.
59
  Although public opinion 
has continually been in favor of the death penalty, multiple attempts to reintroduce it have 
failed.
60
 
 
 The United Kingdom’s abolition of the death penalty differs from the German story in 
two important ways. First, abolition in the United Kingdom occurred in stages, with a 
moratorium preceding final abolition, whereas the Germans abolished capital punishment in one 
fell swoop.  Second, the United Kingdom’s political elite made deft use of parliamentary 
procedures that allowed them to distance themselves from the legislation.  But, in both countries, 
the story is still essentially one of political elites making decisions contrary to public opinion.  
These strategies were seen as “elite measures, which were crafted and implemented in response 
to advances in criminology and psychology, rather than [in reaction] to pressure from public 
opinion.”61 
 
C.  Canada 
 
Canada’s path to abolition included many of the same elements as those in other case 
histories: strong support from committed elites whose views differed substantially from those of 
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the public, multiple moratoriums before final abolition, research finding that the moratoria did 
not increase crime, and passage of the critical legislation by free votes.  The Canadian Executive 
kickstarted the process by using the clemency power to create a de facto moratorium and unlike 
in Germany or the United Kingdom, the parliamentary debate was especially prolonged and 
impassioned, focusing on moral objections to the state taking life.  Although subsequent efforts 
to reinstate capital punishment have come close to success in the past, treaty obligations now 
commit Canada to abolition.  
 
Executive action created a de facto moratorium from 1963–67.  When the Liberal Party 
came to power, the federal cabinet exercised the crown’s clemency power to commute every 
capital case to life imprisonment.
62
  During this informal moratorium, support for the death 
penalty in Parliament declined.
63
  After four years under the de facto moratorium, the Canadian 
Solicitor General published a report concluding that suspension of the death penalty had not 
increased the homicide rate.
 64
  
 
The federal government then proposed legislation to impose a formal moratorium, as well 
as other bills intended to make Canada’s sentencing laws more humane.  Because the minority 
government recognized that capital punishment was still considered legitimate by much of the 
country and that Parliament itself was deeply divided, it proposed a compromise: an 
experimental five-year moratorium excluding those convicted of mudering police officers and 
other law enforcement officials.
65
  Under a new prime minister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, this 
moratorium was extended.
66
 
 
In 1976, the staunchly abolitionist Solicitor General introduced Bill C-84 to abolish the 
death penalty.
67
  Despite the fact that over 70 percent of the population supported capital 
punishment,
68
 Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau gave the bill his “impassioned” support.69    
He characterized capital punishment as “the emotive response of a ‘socially bankrupt’ society,” 
not fit for a modern, rational state.
70
  Parliament remained deeply divided, and the debate was 
highly charged and prolonged: 120 members spoke over a period of several months.
71
  
Opponents questioned the legitimacy of the bill in light of the strong popular support for the 
death penalty, raised the specter of terrorism and increases in violent crime, and tried to weaken 
the bill with amendments.  The bill’s fate was uncertain. 
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The Prime Minister and Solicitor General opted for a free vote, because it would insulate 
the government if the vote failed.  The bill passed by a slim margin of 130 to 124, abolishing the 
death penalty for all ordinary offenses.
72
   
 
Although Parliament came close to reinstating the death penalty in 1987, Canada remains 
abolitionist.
73
  In 2005, the Canadian government signed and ratified the Second Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (aimed at international 
abolition of the death penalty), which now prevents Canada from reinstating the death penalty.
74
  
 
D.      France 
 
 France’s path to abolition was similar to that of Canada’s: the executive was the moving 
force in revising the penal code and abolishing capital punishment in 1981.
75
 Even though public 
opinion favored the death penalty, François Mitterand announced during his campaign for 
President that he would abolish capital punishment if elected.
76
  Once Mitterand and his leftist 
parties took office, the new Justice Minister, Robert Badinter, expedited review of the abolition 
law through parliament. The French Parliament then abolished the death penalty by a vote de 
conscience.
77
 Strong executive leadership, influenced by French academics and law reform 
committees,
78
 provided the catalyst that led to abolition.  It is worthy of note, however, that the 
vote de conscience meant that abolition reflected the sentiments of the individual members of 
parliament rather than their party. 
 
International treaties and a constitutional amendment subsequently cemented France’s 
stance as an abolitionist country.  Because the French Constitution provides that treaties prevail 
over acts of parliament,
79
 after France signed and ratified Protocol 6 to the European Convention 
on Human Rights, it became much more difficult for French lawmakers to reintroduce capital 
punishment.  The only way for France to bring back the death penalty would have been to 
repudiate the treaty, exposing it to external criticism and repercussions.
80
  In 2007, France further 
raised the institutional barriers to the reintroduction of capital punishment by modifying its 
constitution to prohibit the death penalty.
81
  Despite persistent public opposition, France has 
rendered its absolutionist stance irrevocable for all practical purposes. 
 
II. Public Opinion, Politics, the Supreme Court, and Retention in the U.S.  
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In the U.S., the story was quite different.  Following a Supreme Court decision that 
created a de facto moratorium in 1972, legislatures in two thirds of the states acted quickly to 
write new legislation reinstating the death penalty.  Although U.S. public support for capital 
punishment had dropped to 50%—a much lower rate than any of the case-study countries at the 
time of abolition—both state and federal politicians came under extreme pressure to support the 
death penalty.  Public support for capital punishment surged, and it became a major political 
issue over the next four decades.  Both parties embraced it.   
 
Confronted with the surge in public support, the Supreme Court developed an Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence that depends upon public opinion.  The Court has employed this 
doctrine to limit, but not prohibit, capital punishment.  
 
A. Support for Capital Punishment Declines and the Supreme Court Imposes a De 
Facto Moratorium  
 
After World War II there was significant support in the U.S. for the abolition of the death 
penalty.  As measured by public opinion polls, support for capital punishment declined through 
the 1950s and early 1960s to a low of 42% in 1966.
82
  Between 1964 and 1969 six states 
abolished capital punishment, and the number of executions fell from 15 executions in 1964, to 
seven in 1965, one in 1966, two in 1967, and then none from 1968 until the mid 1970s.
83
  By 
1969, 10 states had abolished capital punishment, but it was still authorized in the remaining 40 
states and in federal prosecutions.
84
 
 
Opponents of the death penalty mounted a sustained effort to persuade the Supreme 
Court that the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment in contemporary U.S. 
society.  In 1972, they had a major victory.  In Furman v. Georgia,
85
 a five-to-four majority set 
aside the death sentences in three cases from Georgia and Texas.  The result was announced in a 
short per curiam opinion that provided no explanation of the decision.  Each member of the 
Court wrote separately, and their opinions totaled 230 pages.   
 
Two Justices concluded that imposing capital punishment violated the Eighth 
Amendment because it was incompatible with evolving conceptions of human dignity.  Justice 
Brennan compared capital punishment to “barbaric” punishments like the rack and the 
thumbscrew,
 86
 and he concluded that in contemporary society it was morally unacceptable.  
Justice Marshall wrote that the death penalty made no measureable contribution to legitimate 
legislative objectives, and that the average American citizen, if fully informed on the issue, 
would find it “shocking to his conscience and sense of justice.”87   
 
                                                          
82
 SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, Table 2.51.2013, available at 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t2512013.pdf (last visited June 18, 2014). 
83
 Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1, 13 & n. 42 (2007). 
84
 Id.  
85
 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
86
 Id. at 272(J. Brennan concurring). 
87
 Id. at 369(J. Marshall concurring). 
13 ‒ Draft June 20, 2014  
 
In contrast, the three other justices who made up the majority focused on the capital 
sentencing procedures. In trials for capital offenses, juries in most states returned a sentence 
recommendation at the same time they returned a guilty verdict, and the typical jury instructions 
provided no standards or criteria for making this decision.  Moreover, juries generally heard no 
evidence about the defendant’s character, personal background, or prior criminal history.  Justice 
Douglas wrote that these sentencing statutes operated in a manner that was “pregnant with 
discrimination” against poor, black defendants.88 Of 3,895 persons executed between 1930 and 
1968, 2,066 were black.
89
  Of the 2,306 persons executed in the Southern states during this 
period, 72% were black.  Justice White stated that the Georgia statute provided “no meaningful 
basis” for distinguishing the cases where death was imposed from others in which it was not.90  
Justice Stewart wrote that capital punishment was being “wantonly and freakishly imposed,” and 
he compared it to being hit by lightning.
91
   
 
The justices in the majority believed that invalidating the death penalty was the correct 
action as a matter of policy, and Justices Stewart and White based their votes on the assumption 
that affirming the death penalty in the case before them would only delay its inevitable 
abolition.
92
  Their actions seem to parallel the elite actions in the countries examined in the case 
study above. 
 
Although there was no majority opinion in Furman, all capital punishment statutes in the 
United States had the same procedural flaws as the Georgia and Texas statutes.  Accordingly, the 
Furman decision effectively invalidated every death penalty statute then in force, producing a de 
facto moratorium on capital punishment throughout the United States.  Opponents hoped that this 
would be the end of capital punishment in the United States.  It was not. 
 
B. The States Respond to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court Responds to 
the States 
 
Furman provoked a dramatic response from the state legislatures.  In just four years, 35 
states—including Georgia and Texas—enacted new capital sentencing statutes designed to 
respond to the procedural objections of Justices Douglas, White, and Stewart.  In Gregg v. 
Georgia, a 7-to-2 majority of the Supreme Court held that Georgia’s new “guided discretion” 
capital sentencing scheme was constitutional.
93
  These new procedures, the majority ruled, 
sufficiently addressed the concern that the death penalty would be imposed in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner.  In a later case, the Court acknowledged that the state legislative action had 
been critical to its decision in Gregg: 
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Thirty-five States immediately reinstituted the death penalty for at least limited 
kinds of crime.  This public judgment as to the acceptability of capital 
punishment, evidenced by the immediate, post-Furman legislative reaction in a 
large majority of the States, heavily influenced the Court to sustain the death 
penalty for murder in Gregg v. Georgia.
94
 
 
Gregg held that the death penalty could not be imposed if it caused unnecessary and 
wanton infliction of pain or if it was grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.  
Whether the death penalty was constitutionally excessive would be determined by “the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,”95 rather than by an analysis 
of historical practice at the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted.  Consistency with evolving 
standards of decency would be determined by two factors.  First, the Court would consider the 
“objective evidence” of a national consensus, particularly the enactments of the nation’s 
legislatures and actual implementation of the punishment where a legislature makes it available.  
This methodology implicitly countered the criticism that the Court was simply imposing its own 
policy preference in the guise of constitutional interpretation.
96
  Only after considering these 
objective indicators would the Court make its own subjective judgment of what cruel and 
unusual punishment meant under the Eighth Amendment, and would then be the final arbiter on 
the matter. 
 
C. U.S. Public Opinion Favoring Capital Punishment Skyrockets and the Political 
Elites Get the Message 
 
The U.S. experienced a steep rise in support for capital punishment beginning in the early 
1970s.  When the strength of the public’s views became clear, the elites generally fell into line, 
expressing their own strong support for retention and implementation of the death penalty.  
Although many Democrats initially opposed the death penalty and other punitive crime policies, 
they generally jumped on the bandwagon when it became clear that opposition would cost them 
elections. 
 
By 1976, when the Supreme Court decided Gregg, 66% of the public supported capital 
punishment, and support continued to increase, peaking at 80% in 1994 and then holding steady 
at roughly 70–75% until the turn of the century.97  Crime became a major political issue.  
National polls identified crime as the most important problem facing the United States in every 
year from 1994 to 1998, and in 1999 and 2000 it was selected as the second or third most 
important problem.
98
  Although a full discussion of the “law and order” politics and the “war on 
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crime” is beyond the scope of this paper,99 commentators have identified a variety of factors that 
seem to have played a role.  These include concern about the rising crime rates, a dramatic rise in 
sensational coverage of violent crime in the news media, a backlash against the gains of the civil 
rights movement, and opportunist Republican efforts to attract formerly Democratic voters 
(especially those in Southern States that had most strongly opposed national civil rights 
legislation associated with the Democratic party).
100
   
 
In this atmosphere, harsher penalties, including the death penalty, became “an issue 
people cared about, an emotional issue of powerful symbolic significance,”101 and attitudes about 
the death penalty came to have “powerful symbolic significance, support for the death penalty 
representing and ideological self-definition of the person as unyielding in the war on crime, 
unwilling to coddle criminals, firm and courageous.”102 
 
Recognizing the power of the issue, U.S. politicians emphasized their support for the 
death penalty.  At the state level, for example, the death penalty played a prominent role in three 
gubernatorial races in 1990:  
  
In California, John K. Van de Kamp ran a television advertisement with a gas chamber in 
the background, highlighting the number of murderers that he put or kept on death row in 
his roles as District Attorney and Attorney General. In Texas, Jim Mattox ran against 
Ann Richards in the Democratic primary with ads taking credit for thirty-two executions 
in his role as Attorney General. In Florida, incumbent Governor Bob Martinez ran ads 
boasting of the ninety-plus death warrants he had signed while in office. 
103
 
 
The death penalty has also been an important factor in many federal elections, including 
presidential elections.  In a nationally televised 1988 presidential debate Democratic candidate 
Michael Dukakis was badly hurt when he said he would not change his opposition to the death 
penalty if his wife were raped and murdered.  Reporters concluded that Dukakis lost the debate 
in that single answer, and viewers across the country reported expressed “outrage” at his 
response.  Indeed, almost 20 years later his response is still being cited as an example of the kind 
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of answer that can kill a political candidate’s career.104  Subsequent Democratic candidates did 
not make the same mistake.  Indeed, then Governor Bill Clinton returned to Arkansas during his 
1992 presidential campaign to facilitate the execution of a mentally disabled murderer.
105
  In 
2000, each of the initial eleven candidates for president, despite their ideological differences, 
declared his support for the death penalty.
106
  Current President Barak Obama supports capital 
punishment (though he notes that it should be reserved for heinous crimes).
107
 
 
D. The Supreme Court’s Majoritarian Constitutional Doctrine 
 
One of the puzzles of the U.S. experience is how to explain the Supreme Court’s actions, 
and the related question of how to assess them.  The Court’s 1972 decision in Furman was 
surprising for several reasons: the decision had no support in the text of the Constitution (which 
clearly provides for capital punishment), and the Court itself had recently turned back a 
challenge to state capital punishment procedures.
108
  In 1972 the Furman majority reached out 
for the issue and broke entirely new ground.  But just four years later in Gregg it backed down, 
announcing a new Eighth Amendment doctrine that has been widely criticized as lacking a firm 
constitutional foundation and failing to achieve its declared purposes, while nonetheless still 
managing to unduly interfere with the democratic legislative process. 
 
1. Explaining the Court’s decision 
 
I find persuasive the argument that the majority was acting in Furman (as elites did in 
other abolitionist nations) to advance its own view of good policy, but that it was completely 
unprepared for the strong public reaction and unwilling to stake its institutional prestige on the 
issue.  As Corinna Barrett Lain has explained, the pressure on the Court was fierce, and its 
legitimacy was at stake: 
 
In 1976, remaining true to Furman's holding would have been hazardous to the 
Court's institutional authority. In the wake of Furman, legislators had threatened a 
constitutional amendment to reinstate the death penalty, and by 1976, they were 
close to having the numbers to pull something like that off.  Even a failed, but 
concerted, attempt to override the Court would have been a severe blow to its 
power and legitimacy. With public opinion favoring the death penalty 2 to 1, both 
political parties aligning on the issue, and the solicitor general asking the Court to 
overrule its 1972 decision, it is hard to imagine the Justices in Gregg doing 
anything other than what they did--retreat.
109
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It is understandable, then, that the majority sought to articulate a doctrine that placed 
some limits on the imposition of capital punishment without provoking a constitutional or 
political crisis.  But what of the doctrine that it developed? 
 
2. Critiques of the Supreme Court’s doctrine 
 
The first criticism is that Court’s doctrine is far too limited:  it provides only 
“constitutional protection that follows, rather than frustrates, majority will, prohibiting a 
punishment only after most states have abandoned it on their own.”110   
 
A second criticism is that the statutory schemes endorsed by the Court do not solve the 
problem of arbitrary and discriminatory application of the death penalty.  Statistical reviews 
found continuing disparities by race of the victim, with suspects charged with killing white 
victims far more likely to receive the death penalty than those who killed black victims.
111
  The 
Supreme Court held that a study finding such disparities in the application of Georgia’s statute 
did not demonstrate a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
112
  In contrast, the American Law 
Institute—which had promulgated the template upon which all post-Furman statutes depend—
withdrew its support in 2009, citing “intractable institutional and structural obstacles to ensuring 
a minimally adequate system for administering capital punishment.”113  
  
Critics charge that the doctrine announced in Gregg fails on its own terms, because the 
Court has been unable—or unwilling—to make a truly “objective” determination of state 
practices and public attitudes.  In many of its cases, plausible arguments could be made for 
different categorizations of state law that favor or undermine a finding of a national consensus, 
and the analysis by both the majority and dissent appears to be rather transparently result-driven, 
rather than objective.
114
  Moreover, the Court has flip-flopped, reversing recent decisions after a 
slim majority identified a new consensus precluding the execution of juveniles and persons who 
are mentally ill.
115
   
 
A closely related problem is that the Court’s own decisions have constrained—and in some 
cases precluded—the development of any new consensus on the desirability of extending the 
death penalty.  For example, a sharply divided Court held in 2008 that the Eighth Amendment 
barred the state of Louisiana from imposing the death penalty for the rape of a child where the 
crime did not result, and was not intended to result, in the victim's death.
116
  The majority 
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emphasized that only six states permitted the imposition of the death penalty for rape of a child.  
More broadly, the decision appeared to signal that (absent a change in the Court’s membership) 
death would be deemed disproportionate to any crime against an individual person in which the 
victim’s life was not taken, though the majority also noted that it was expressing no opinion 
about capital punishment for crimes against the state, such as treason.
117
  In dissent, Justice Alito 
observed that the Court’s prior decisions had stunted legislative consideration of the question 
whether the death penalty for the targeted offense of raping a young child is consistent with 
prevailing standards of decency, and its decision was extinguishing what might well have been 
the beginning of new trend.
118
 
 
IV. A Few Observations and Conclusions  
 
The case studies confirmed that at least in the particular times of abolition in Germany, 
the U.K., Canada, and France, elite opinion turned against the death penalty and brought about 
abolition despite strong public support for retention.  To some degree, these elite actors relied 
upon a degree of insulation from public opinion and pressure that does not exist for elected 
officials in the United States, and they had a conception of their role that is not widely shared by 
U.S. political elites. 
 
 The comparison to the experience in these countries also highlights the importance of the 
U.S. federal system and its allocation of authority over criminal law to the States.  With a few 
limited exceptions, the Supreme Court has now left control of capital punishment to the 
democratic process at the states level.   
 
 Dramatic regional differences in attitudes and practices have emerged.  By the turn of the 
century, national polls began to show a significant decline in support for capital punishment,
 
and 
a recent poll found that only 42% favored the death penalty for murder if life without parole 
were available.
119
 Three states have abolished the death penalty since 2011.
120
  But support 
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remains strong in some regions, and capital punishment has become a minority practice localized 
almost entirely in a small number of states, and within certain counties.  Since the Supreme 
Court reinstituted the death penalty in 1976, 2,008 persons have been executed; 1,754 of those 
were executed in Texas, Oklahoma, and states in the South.
121
  Texas alone accounted for 515 of 
the total executions.
122
 One advocacy group reports that only 2% of the counties in the U.S. have 
been responsible for the majority of cases leading to executions, as well as the majority of the 
current population of death row.
123
 
 
 Allocating authority over the retention of the death penalty to the states means that there 
is no mechanism to enforce a national policy of abolition, should such a policy develop, other 
than through the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  Moreover, at the state and 
local level, international norms—which might have some traction with the national 
government—are generally unpersuasive. 
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